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THE FINANCIALLY ORIENTED DIRECTOR 
New Role and New Responsibility 
by RUSSELL E. PALMER/Manag ing Partner, Touche Ross & Co, 
Is the rote of the f inanc ia l ly o r ien ted d i rec tor d i f f e ren t f rom that of o the r corporate directors? 
To a degree it is. 
Most d i rectors tend to see 
themselves as d i rectors first, p lac ing 
their p r imary occupa t ions , skills, 
personal interests, and even their 
board c o m m i t t e e membersh ips in a 
context of broad responsibi l i ty—a 
v iew that is both appropr ia te and 
necessary. A f inanc ia l ly o r ien ted 
director, l ike any other, needs this 
breadth o f v is ion because, ul t imately, 
his j ob is direr ling, no t doing. A 
d i rector w i t h a f inancia l background 
shou ld no t assume a broader respon-
sibi l i ty for all f inanc ia l prob lems, nor 
shou ld he nar row his responsib i l i ty to 
exc lude o the r matters. 
Lawyers migh t argue that all 
d i rectors bear the same responsibi l i ty, 
but whe the r they w o u l d advise all 
d i rector-c l ients to assume the same 
role is open to quest ion. W h a t is 
certain is that the roles of these 
directors have changed. In his testi-
mony before the Senate Judic iary 
Commit tee 's subcommi t t ee on 
c i t izens ' and shareholders' rights and 
remedies in 1977, J. W i l son N e w m a n , 
a ret ired cha i rman of the board of 
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D u n & Bradstreet and a d i rec tor of 
Lockheed Aircraf t Corpora t ion , raised 
an impor tan t po in t about the 
changing role of directors: "Added 
responsibi l i t ies are being placed on 
directors and being demanded now, 
in terms of legal concept They have 
been there all the t ime, but n o w they 
have sur faced" 
Before Watergate, for example, 
h o w many directors w o u l d have 
bothered to ask about corporate 
codes of conduc t , i l legal po l i t i ca l 
con t r ibu t ions , or br ibery o f foreign 
government off ic ials? Or, unt i l 
recently, h o w many directors w o u l d 
have asked about w o m e n or m ino r i -
ties in their organizat ions? Few, 
probably. Now, under the law, 
directors must concern themselves 
w i t h such quest ions. 
Adapting to Reality 
A 1975 Conference Board report 
suggests ano ther impor tan t area of 
change. The report , ent i t led 
"Corporate Di rec torsh ip Practices; 
Role, Selection and Legal Status of 
the Board," cites the " increasing legal 
recogni t ion of the complex i t ies of 
modern business, and of the diver-
gent backgrounds, experience, and 
responsibi l i t ies a m o n g directors on 
the board." Moreover , the art ic le 
argues, there is a t rend toward "more 
f lexibi l i ty, w i t h the law adapt ing itself 
to the prob lems at hand." No longer 
do the same pr inc ip les necessarily 
"govern the d i rectors of all corpora-
t i o n s - w h e t h e r a thousand or a 
b i l l i on dol lar opera t ion or whe the r a 
service or a manu fac tu r ing organiza-
t ion." Nor does every d i rec tor bear 
" the same responsibi l i ty, whe the r he 
be an insider, an of f icer, an outsider, 
an attorney, an investment banker, an 
educator, an env i ronmenta l i s t , or 
whatever. Signif icantly, there are more 
and more instances of cour ts look-
ing to the realit ies of the facts 
presented," 
Those " rea l i t ies" are far f rom clear. 
But one th ing is b e c o m i n g more 
apparent—special ized know ledge 
does in f luence the role a d i rector w i l l 
play wh i le serving on a board. An 
of f icer-director, for example, can 
gather more f rom the i n fo rma t ion the 
board receives about corporate act iv-
ities than a d i rec to r w h o has not 
served as a m e m b e r o f corporate 
management . Similarly, the f inanc ia l ly 
or iented d i rec tor is expected to apply 
his exper ience and insight to the 
board's business. As an examp le , the 
accoun tan t or i nves tmen t banker is 
p resumably bet ter at spo t t ing i ncon -
sistencies in a draft annua l repor t 
than an env i ronmen ta l i s t o r 
c lergyman. 
In many states, s ta tu tory law 
re inforces these assumpt ions . The 
M o d e l Business C o r p o r a t i o n Act , as 
revised in 1975, au thor i zes a d i rec to r 
to rely on i n f o r m a t i o n , op i n i ons , 
reports, o r s ta tements—inc lud ing 
f inanc ia l s ta tements ar id o the r f i nan -
cial data prepared by corpora te 
employees , ou ts ide experts, o r a 
board c o m m i t t e e of w h i c h he is not a 
member. The exception is when he 
has knowledge which would cause 
such reliance to be unwarranted 
A c c o r d i n g to the act , the f i nan -
cial ly o r i en ted d i rec to r must be ready 
to apply his k n o w l e d g e of 
accoun t i ng , aud i t i ng , o r o t h e r f inan-
cial matters shou ld events warrant . 
He can and shou ld evaluate the 
c red ib i l i t y of the data fu rn ished h im , 
" read ing" f inanc ia l s tatements, 
reports, and even d iscussions at 
board meet ings to de te rm ine if 
any th i ng is unusua l or incons is tent 
Di rectors are no t requ i red to ver i fy al l 
i n f o r m a t i o n on w h i c h they base the i r 
dec is ions; the M o d e l Business 
Co rpo ra t i on Act says that a d i rec to r 
can rely on the data fu rn ished h im 
w h e n he does so in g o o d fa i th. 
In Litwin v. Allen, the c o u r t ru led 
that a l t hough d i rectors are not l iab le 
for mistakes of j u d g m e n t w h i l e ac t ing 
w i t h reasonable ski l l or p rudence , 
they must no t be negl igent . In the 
Stirling Ho rn ex case, the SEC p u b l i c l y 
c r i t i c i zed t w o outs ide d i rectors for 
fa i l ing to fu l f i l l the i r responsib i l i t ies , 
even t h o u g h ne i ther had reason to 
bel ieve that the St i r l ing H o m e x f inan-
cial s tatements were false and 
mis leading. In this case, the c o m m i s -
sion also c i ted the in frequency- and 
pe r func to ry nature o f the board 's 
meet ings, the absence of an audi t 
c o m m i t t e e , a n d the d i rectors ' fa i lu re 
to i n f o r m themselves abou t ant) 
exercise c o n t r o l over the a c c o u n t i n g 
pr inc ip les used. 
The Stirling Homex case shou ld 
serve as a w a r n i n g to the f inanc ia l ly 
o r ien ted d i rector , suggest ing strongly 
that he educa te h imsel f abou t the 
increasingly c o m p l e x nature of f i nan -
cial repor t ing. Mere l y keep ing up 
w i t h the n e w d e v e l o p m e n t s in this 
area is a ma jo r under tak ing , as a 
glance at the many sources of gener-
ally accep ted a c c o u n t i n g p r inc ip les 
w i l l c o n f i r m . They inc lude : 
• The statements of the Financial 
A c c o u n t i n g Standards Board 
• Technical bu l le t ins issued by the 
FASB staff. 
• The ASRs and o the r p romu lga -
t ions of the SEC, 
• The s ta tements of pos i t i on issued 
by the a c c o u n t i n g standards execu-
tive c o m m i t t e e of the AICPA. 
• O t h e r AICPA pub l i ca t i ons , such 
as aud i t and a c c o u n t i n g guides. 
The SEC Role 
As f o rm idab le as this list appears, 
f inanc ia l repor t i ng encompasses 
more than general ly accep ted 
a c c o u n t i n g pr inc ip les. The SEC plays 
a ma jo r role in shap ing repor t i ng 
pract ices in the U.S., requ i r ing d isc lo-
sure of eve ry th ing f rom the proper-
ties o w n e d by an issuer to detai ls 
about managemen t c o m p e n s a t i o n 
and perquis i tes. A n d these require-
ments change, and somet imes 
radical ly. 
O n e especia l ly i m p o r t a n t examp le 
of SEC in te r ven t i on is its o n g o i n g 
in te rp re ta t ion of the Foreign Cor rup t 
Practices Act . The commiss ion ' s ASR 
242 has a l ready addressed the 
a c c o u n t i n g standards requ i rements 
of the act and the repor t i ng of 
ques t ionab le payments . The SEC has 
recent ly c i r cu la ted new proposals, 
i n c l u d i n g a r equ i r emen t that w i l l 
have far-reaching ef fects on all 
pub l i c l y he ld businesses. The c o m -
miss ion wants managemen t to 
represent that its systems of in terna l 
a c c o u n t i n g and c o n t r o l p rov ide 
reasonable assurances that the b road 
ob jec t ives stated in the act are 
ach ieved " w i t h o u t mater ia l i t y of 
amoun ts . " Obv ious ly , the f inanc ia l l y 
o r ien ted d i rec to r shou ld m o n i t o r the 
commiss ion ' s act iv i t ies in this area 
w i t h care. He shou ld d o more , 
however. Because of his special 
know ledge , he can "educa te " his 
fe l l ow d i rectors abou t the imp l i ca -
t ions of t he SEC's d e e p e n i n g invo lve -
ment . 
The f inanc ia l l y o r i en ted d i rec to r 
shou ld be fami l ia r w i t h p r inc ip les , 
requ i rements , and the relevant act iv i -
ties of regu la tory agencies w h i c h 
af fect the company . The k n o w l e d g e 
requi red w i l l vary, d e p e n d i n g on the 
dep th of the company ' s i nvo l vemen t 
w i t h the agency. 
W h i l e an acqua in tance w i t h the 
legal c l ima te is ex t remely impo r t an t 
for all d i rec tors , it is par t i cu la r l y so 
for the f inanc ia l l y o r i en ted d i rector . 
Legal requ i rements are imposed by 
the cour ts , the M o d e l o r State 
Business Co rpo ra t i on Act , and by 
app l i cab le federal law and regula-
t ions. Obv ious ly , each d i rec to r 
shou ld keep up w i t h the t rends in 
case taw and statutes and make some 
a t tempt to recogn ize w h e r e these are 
l ikely to lead. I n f o r m a t i o n on legal 
d e v e l o p m e n t s can be f o u n d in a 
n u m b e r of pub l i ca t i ons , in the 
admin is t ra t i ve ac t ions b r o u g h t by the 
SEC, and in speeches g iven by the 
SEC commiss ione rs and staff, as we l l 
as by law professors and others. 
A i d i n g the d i rec to r in his quest for 
i n f o r m a t i o n abou t his legal responsi -
bi l i t ies are such pub l i ca t i ons as "The 
Corpora te Director 's G u i d e b o o k , " 
prepared in 197b by an Amer i can Bar 
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Assoc ia t ion s u b c o m m i t t e e , and the 
excel lent C o n f e r e n c e Board research 
reports. The Con fe rence Board, the 
Nat iona l Assoc ia t ion of Corpora te 
Di rectors, a n d a n u m b e r of repu tab le 
academic i ns t i t u t i ons h o l d educa-
t iona l seminars for d i rectors. Finally, 
each year, b o t h spec ia l ized and 
general pub l i ca t i ons address the legal 
needs of d i rec tors . Even t h o u g h these 
pub l i ca t i ons and seminars d o no t 
usual ly deal w i t h matters conce rn ing 
the f inanc ia l l y o r i en ted d i rec to r 
specif ical ly, they d isseminate m u c h 
va luable i n f o r m a t i o n . 
Using the Advantage 
At first g lance, hav ing a f inanc ia l 
backg round may appear to p lace 
excessive burdens o n a consc ien -
t ious director , w h i l e increasing his 
exposure to l iabi l i ty . In reality, a 
f inanc ia l o r i en ta t i on can be tu rned to 
advantage, for it enables a d i rec to r to 
c o n t r i b u t e more to the c o m p a n y in 
his capac i ty as a d i rec to r w h i l e he 
also protects h imse l f legally. 
If I mysel f were serv ing as a 
d i rec to r of a co rpo ra t i on , I w o u l d ask 
to be a p p o i n t e d to the audi t 
c o m m i t t e e . M e m b e r s h i p on that 
c o m m i t t e e w o u l d a l l ow me to make 
the most of the t ime spent in 
fu l f i l l i ng the p o r t i o n of my d i rec tor -
ship o b l i g a t i o n a l loca ted to f inanc ia l 
matters. No t o n l y c o u l d I use my 
exper ience as an accoun tan t , b u t 1 
w o u l d also have greater access to 
f inanc ia l i n f o r m a t i o n . W i t h b o t h the 
i n f o r m a t i o n and the t ime to cons ider 
it, 1 c o u l d s ign i f icant ly reduce the 
l i ke l i hood that I w o u l d miss some-
th ing i m p o r t a n t - t h e some th ing 
I m igh t be expec ted to d iscover 
because of m y f inanc ia l backg round . 
O n e of the most d i f f i cu l t 
chal lenges for d i rec tors may be 
c o p i n g w i t h the manner in w h i c h 
in f luen t ia l cr i t ics and g roups have 
in terpre ted the i r ro le—everyone w h o 
seriously considers this sub jec t 
r e c o m m e n d s some i m p r o v e m e n t s in 
the system. In impo r t an t instances, 
the cour ts are p rov id i ng in terpreta-
t ions The Killearn case o f fers a good 
example. 
The consent j u d g m e n t resul t ing 
f rom the SEC's en fo rcemen t ac t ion 
against K i l learn Propert ies, Inc., 
mandates an audi t c o m m i t t e e 
c o m p o s e d of three ou ts ide d i rectors. 
It also prescribes ten speci f ic dut ies, 
such as rev iew ing the engagement of 
i ndependen t accoun tan ts , the 
company ' s p rocedures for in ternal 
aud i t i ng and its a c c o u n t i n g and 
f inanc ia l con t ro ls , and all i n f o r m a t i o n 
abou t the f inanc ia l c o n d i t i o n of the 
c o m p a n y and its subsidiar ies w h i c h 
w i l l be d issemina ted by the c o m p a n y 
to the pub l i c . No responsib le d i rec to r 
can afford to ignore the imputa t ions 
of this ru l ing. 
The Board's Duties 
In sat isfy ing these demands , wha t 
shou ld the f inanc ia l l y o r ien ted 
d i rec to r do? I can best app roach this 
ques t ion by shar ing some though ts 
abou t wha t I w o u l d do if I were a 
d i rec to r today. M y t h i n k i n g is based 
on a s imple premise: i nd i v idua l board 
members must have a clear idea o f 
the board's dut ies. 
First, the board shou ld spend a few 
minu tes at cer ta in meet ings to 
cons ider fo rma l l y the scope of b o t h 
its act iv i t ies and those of its var ious 
commi t tees . Then, the f inanc ia l l y 
o r ien ted d i rec to r shou ld try to in f lu -
ence the aud i t c o m m i t t e e to cons ider 
whe the r it s h o u l d under take each of 
the ten act iv i t ies l isted in the Ki l learn 
cour t order. 
A f inanc ia l ly o r i en ted d i rec to r also 
shou ld d e v e l o p some cr i ter ia to gu ide 
the audi t c o m m i t t e e . For example , I 
w o u l d no t insist that the aud i t 
c o m m i t t e e au tomat i ca l l y rev iew and 
approve al l pub l i c releases con ta i n i ng 
f inanc ia l i n f o r m a t i o n i f : 1} The 
outs ide aud i to rs p e r f o r m e d quar ter ly 
reviews of i n te r im i n f o r m a t i o n . 2) 
The results w e r e reasonably in l ine 
w i t h budgets or plans. 3) Past audi ts 
had no t revealed that s ign i f icant 
errors escaped t imely de tec t i on by 
the company ' s system of Internal 
con t ro ls and rev iew of f inanc ia l 
management . A u d i t c o m m i t t e e 
i n v o l v e m e n t w i l l b e c o m e essential if 
the i ndependen t CPAs d iscover a 
p rob lem or if the results represent a 
s ign i f icant depar tu re f r o m p lan. 
A d i rec to r shou ld o p p o s e over-
load ing the board 's agenda. If the 
board canno t deal w i t h no rma l 
business in its meet ings, it shou ld 
cons ider f o r m i n g add i t i ona l s tand ing 
c o m m i t t e e s or specia l c o m m i t t e e s to 
deal w i t h i m p o r t a n t matters in suf f i -
c ient deta i l The board can de f ine its 
role, in part , by i den t i f y i ng matters 
that requi re i n -dep th a t ten t i on . 
Boards have b u i l t - i n mechan isms 
for fu l f i l l i ng the i r respons ib i l i t ies and 
p ro tec t i ng their members . If co rp -
orate o f f i c ia ls and emp loyees are 
not f u n c t i o n i n g as they s h o u l d - t h u s 
weaken ing the re l iance that may be 
p laced on (hern—the boa rd has a 
clear duty. 
Reasonable Expectations 
W h i l e these suggest ions are cer ta in ly 
far f r o m exhaust ive, they do po in t to 
some matters that the f inanc ia l l y 
o r ien ted d i rec to r m igh t keep in m i n d . 
Richard Whate ly , a 19th cen tu ry 
A r c h b i s h o p of D u b l i n , o n c e observed 
that " I t is fo l ly to expect men to d o 
al l that they may reasonably be 
expected to do. " Tai lor ing Arch-
b ishop Whate ly ' s remarks to ou r 
o w n t ime, w e can u n f o r t u n a t e l y 
an t i c ipa te that someone w i l l a lways 
expect a board to d o more t han it 
may reasonably be expected to do. In 
the face of these demands , al l we can 
d o is try. 
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